Imperial Amnesia

Imperial Amnesia is a term used by John Judis (2004) to describe the American remembrance of past military adventures in foreign lands. Using the occupation of the Philippines following our victory against Spain in 1899 Judis (2004) outlines how the Unites States has rewritten the past to justify were we are today in our foreign policy. Comparing Judis’ article with Stoessinger’s Vietnam War essay, “A Greek Tragedy in Five Acts” I have used our special role American plays in transforming the world, the lack of understanding the concept of knowing your enemies before going to war and how politicians rewrite history for their own purposes.

“Americans have always believed they have a special role to play in transforming the world (Judis 2004).” As the Cold War was beginning to heat up and fearing the Soviet Union would take advantage of the anticolonial movements within Europe’s colonies the United States “sought to establish its own neo-imperial reign (Judis 2004)” in Asia. “Instead of permanently annexing the countries they conquered, after a period of suzerainty, [United States] would retain control by vetoing unfriendly governments and dominating the country’s economy (Judis 2004)”

In 1954 the French had been defeated by the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu agreed to the Geneva Accords dividing Indochina into Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and setting a time table for free elections in 1956. In 1954 the South East Asian Treaty Organization was created by the Unites States making South Vietnam an American protectorate, thus recognizing South Vietnam as a separate state. The United States believing Ho Chi Minh would win free elections supported the establishment of a vassal state; the Republic of Vietnam under the leadership of President Diem. In November 1963, Kennedy allow a coup to overthrow Diem, killing Diem and placing in power someone more the America’s liking. When Nixon took office he and Henry Kissinger developed the concept of “Vietnamization” of the war. It would involve the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam to be replaced by South Vietnamese forces with a “friendly government firmly in Saigon (Stoessinger 2008).”

American foreign policy has a long history of not understanding our enemy. Judis (2008) discusses the Neoconservative agenda and their miscalculation of the nationalist sediments within the different groups. American thought we would be welcomed with flowers but instead we energized those nationalist feelings. This same attitude prevailed as we began empire building with our war in the Philippines and Judis (2004) also shows this lack of understanding in Iraq about the motivation of the enemy. Sun Tzu in the Art of War said, “Know thy enemies” which generally was absent during the entire Vietnam conflict. After the end of WWII the French were fighting a colonial war in Indochina against Ho Chi Minh the US was at first opposed to the French because Truman saw it as a return of French power to the area. By 1948 China became an “active theater of the Cold War” (Stoessinger 2008) the United States began to see the French as “defenders of the west” (Stoessinger 2008). Ho Chi Minh who had been describe by an OSS officer as an “awfully sweet guy whose quality was his gentleness” (Stoessinger 2008) was now seen as part of the international Communist threat. Throughout the conflict American politicians would never come to grips that the main motivation of Ho Chi Minh was nationalism with communism taking second place. Ho Chi Minh’s goal was to drive out the imperial powers and achieve national independence.

During Kennedy’s administration a study was done by two European experts, Asian experts were considered security risks since the days of Joseph McCarthy (Stoessinger 2008). Rostow-Taylor concluded that the growing conflict in Vietnam was similar to the conventional war we had fought in Korea instead of a political struggle with the Vietminh, using guerilla warfare tactics. The one idea that is seen throughout Stoessinger (2008) is that the United States never looked at the Vietnam question from the viewpoint of the Vietnamese.

John Judis (2004) states, “Politicians often rewrite history to their own purposes.” As the Cold War with the Soviets began to shape American foreign policy our language toward Ho changed. The United States’ “perceptual grid of Cold War categories was… superimposed on the older conflict in Indochina (Stoessinger 2008).” As the United States escalated the war so did the Vietnamese in response. The Chinese would only give enough aide to bring a balance to the war. In early 1965 the United States began reprisal bombings against the North. When asked by Emmett John Hughes, “what he would do if the North Vietnamese retaliated by matching American air escalation with their own ground Escalation.” McGovern Bundy (Johnson aide) replied, “We can’t assume what we don’t believe.” (Stoessinger 2008)

President Kennedy made a prophetic comment, “In the last analysis, it is their war; it is they who must win it or lose it (Stoessinger 2008).” In the end South Vietnam made the decision. As today we see in Afghanistan and Iraq it belongs to those people whether their nations will win or lose. John Judis suggests that in order to transform the world we need to adopt Wilson’s vision of global democracy multilaterally. But isn’t that just replacing one from of imperialism with another form. Who will determine who the nations are we would punish. At present China does not to care about democracy so do we make them an enemy? As is being shown in Afghanistan multilateralism will only work when there is little price to pay among the partners. As NATO members have begun to suffer causalities the desire for transforming Afghanistan has lessened. Wilson’s vision involved to “dismantle the structure of imperialism” (Judis 2004) based upon the European powers abdicating imperialism. In today’s world the only nation using imperial tactics is the United States. In ways Europe has replaced the United States by not looking overseas for monsters to destroy.

References

Stoessinger, John G. 2008. Why Nations Go to War. Belmont, CA. Thomson Higher Education

Judis, John B. 2004. Imperial Amnesia. Foreign Policy July/August 2004